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Abstract 
The issues and problems flowing from common competencies are shared by 
many, if not all, decentralised and federal systems; they are a feature arising 
from the division of powers between two levels of government. The problem 
is particularly pronounced when a third level of government is added - local 
government. Common competencies are mainly a function of the way local 
government powers are defined in constitutions. Because of the position of 
local government in the hierarchy of governments, local government is seldom 
given clearly demarcated exclusive powers. Moreover, the supervisory role of 
the 'senior' levels of government over local government, inevitably means that 
concurrency of powers occurs. 
Common competencies create a number of problems for the effective and 
efficient functioning of government. They include the following: duplication 
of services; ineffective service delivery; unfunded mandates for the lowest level 
of government; the domination of local government by 'senior' levels of 
government; and the lack of transparency and accountability. There are 
basically two approaches in dealing with these problems: first, seek greater 
division and certainty in the division of powers; and second, develop 
constructive ways of managing the tension through cooperation between 
levels of government. 
INTRODUCTION 
When introducing a training workshop on the Municipal Finance Management 
Bill, 1 which places a duty on both the national and the provincial 
governments to supervise the financial well-being of mUnicipalities in South 
Africa, a senior provincial official referred to the 'curse of concurrent 
competencies'. For him the overlapping jurisdictions were a curse that 
blighted his work. Concurrent competencies were synonymous with a lack of 
clear definition of roles and responsibilities that, in practice, set the scene for 
'The support of the Ford Foundation for the Local Government Project of the 
Community Law Centre is hereby acknowledged. 
lThe Bill was finally passed as the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
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turf battles. Moreover, where the province and the national government are 
governed by different political parties, political competition further 
complicates the picture. 
Common competencies occur where more than one level of government 
(usually state and local, but not infrequently federal as well), share authority 
(be it legislative, executive or both) over the same functional area. The area 
may be education, health, housing or the environment. The question that then 
arises, is how effective governance can be delivered in these common 
functional areas. 
The issues and problems flowing from common competencies are shared by 
many, if not all, decentralised or federal systems; they are a feature arising 
from the division of powers between two levels of government. Whereas the 
older federations such as the USA, Canada and Australia, sought to establish 
dual federalism, seeking to establish clearly demarcated areas of competence, 
the more modem multi-level governments, such as Germany, India, Brazil and 
South Africa, have all institutionalised the notion of common competencies. 
Local government 
The problem is particularly pronounced when a third level of government is 
added - local government. First of all, functional areas, and thus 
competencies, must now be split three ways, adding to the complexity of 
government. Second, because local government is still regarded as the 
stepchild in federal systems, a clear constitutional demarcation of exclusive 
areas of competence is seldom found. The powers of local government are 
thus often obscured by a mush of federal and state legislation. 
The issue of concurrency is becoming more pronounced as local government 
is increasingly becoming a fully-fledged, constitutionally recognised, form of 
government in countries with federal features. With its status guaranteed in 
constitutions, the allocation of powers that often follows, inevitably entails 
concurrency of powers. 
The first federal constitutions of the modem era did not include local 
government as a level of government, as evidenced by the constitutions of the 
United States (1787), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867) and Australia (1901). 
Local government was Simply a competency of the states or provinces. 
Concurrency issues would normally not arise because the state would 
determine the responsibility of local authorities. If any conflicts arose over 
functions and powers, the superior level of government would simply redefine 
the allocation of competencies to make the conflicts disappear. Resolving such 
conflicts is more complex when the functions of local government are 
contained in a constitution and local self-governance is guaranteed. 
The constitutional recognition and protection of local government have 
occurred during the last fifty years. The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Germany of 1949 enshrined municipalities' right to self-government. Nearly 
twenty years later the Spanish Constitution of 1978 also guaranteed local 
autonomy. Brazil's return to civilian rule was also marked by the extensive 
protection oflocal self-government in the constitution of 1988 and the listing 
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oflocal government's powers. 1992 sawthe entrenchment oflocalgovernment 
in the 73Td and 74th Amendments to the Indian Constitution. South Africa 
followed suit with the extensive protection of local self-government in the 
South African Constitution of 1996. The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 also 
entrenched local government as a level of government. The recognition of 
local government in the new Swiss Constitution of 1999 recognised the 
importance of municipalities and cities in practice. 
Even in those countries where local government is subservient to state or 
provincial government, the problem of common competencies is encountered. 
Initially, municipalities' functions and powers were determined in the greatest 
possible detail by the superior level of government and any conflict would be 
removed by the superior level. Today, however, the issue of concurrency is 
increasing in importance because of changes to the way in which local 
government powers are being defined. At first powers were detailed 'shopping 
lists' which were strictly enforced by the ultra vires rule. Today, municipalities 
are increasingly being given general plenary powers in, for example, the 
United States, Canada and Australia. 
In the first part of the article, the various manifestations of common 
competencies are outlined. The second part contains an exposition of the 
various problems experienced where competencies are common. In the last 
part, possible ways of managing the recurring problems are explored. 
NATURE OF COMMON COMPETENCIES 
Common competencies are mainly a feature of the way in which local 
government powers are defined in constitutions. Because of the position of 
local government in the hierarchy of governments, local government is seldom 
given exclusive powers, neatly tabulated in a list. The supervisory role of the 
'senior' levels of government, inevitably results in concurrency of powers. 
Defining local government competencies 
The constitutional allocation of competencies to local government takes 
various forms. A common approach is to itemise a list of functional areas that 
fall within the domain of municipalities. In India, the 7yd and 74th 
Amendments to the constitution provide a long list of permissible local 
government functions from which the states may determine which should be 
devolved to the various types of local authority.2 The Brazilian Constitution 
of 1988 grants local authorities powers under two broad heads. The first 
involves a general, all-purpose powers common to all three levels of 
government. 3 The second is a more detailed list, reserving powers to local 
government in the areas of intra-municipal transport, pre-school and 
elementary education, preventive health care, land use and historical and 
2See Pervez 'Third-tier of governance' (2001) 2/1 Indian Journal of Federal Studies 
136. 
3Anic1e 23. 
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cultural preservation.4 In South Africa the 1996 Constitution sub-divides the 
provinces' lists of concurrent and exclusive competencies into Parts A and B, 
with the latter listing the functional areas of municipalities. 5 In terms of the 
Nigerian Constitution ofl999, local authorities' functional areas are found in 
two lists. In the first list, broad areas are mentioned in which local authorities 
must participate in state activities. 6 The second list contains more specific, but 
more mundane, municipal functions. 7 
Even in cases where the powers of local government are explicitly listed, it 
seldom means that municipalities have exclusive jurisdiction over the listed 
functional areas; they are usually overlaid with national or provincial 
regulatory frameworks. 
A more limited approach to defining local government powers is to couch 
them in the most general of ways. In a number of constitutions the right of 
local government to manage its 'own affairs' or 'local interests' is guaranteed, 
but the exact ambit of the 'own affairs' or 'local interests' is not spelled out. 
In the German Basic Law the powers of local government are no better 
defined than: 'The municipality shall be guaranteed the right to manage all the 
affairs of the local community on their own responsibility.,8 A similar 
statement is also to be found in the Brazilian Constitution, namely an exclusive 
local government function is to 'legislate on subjects of local interest'. 9 The 
Spanish Constitution, likewise, guarantees that municipalities shall enjoy self-
government for the management of their own interests. 10 
The various ways in which local government competencies are defined, all 
produce some level of overlap between the functions of the state or province 
and local authorities. The following types of overlay and concurrency can be 
identified: 
Explicit concurrent competencies 
The first and most obvious type of common competencies is where specific 
functional areas are given concurrently to the state/province and local 
government. This approach is, of course, not unique to allocation of local 
government powers, but is also used in the distribution of powers between 
federal/national government and states/provinces. The German Basic Law, 11 
the Indian Constitutionl2 and the South African Constitution of 1996,13 all 
4Article 30. See further Souza 'Political and financial decentralization in democratic 




sArticle 28 Gennan Basic Law 1949. 
9Article 30 Brazilian Constitution 1988. 
IOArticle 137 Spanish Constitution 1978. 
lIThe Gennan Basic Law allocates to the federal government both exclusive and 
concurrent powers, the latter being shared with the Lander (art 74 and 74a). 
J2Apart from the exclusive Union and state lists of competencies, there is also a 
concurrent list of fifty-two items (ss 245-246). See further Basu Shorter Constitution 
of India (1994) 829. 
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contain list of concurrent competencies. 
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 offers an example of common 
competencies granted to all three levels of government. In article 23 the 
Union, states and municipalities are given 'joint powers' that cover a range of 
activities from the most general to the more specific. The powers concern the 
general well-being of the nation and include the responsibility to 'safeguard 
public health, to protect the environment and combat pollution in any of its 
forms; to preserve the forests, fauna and flora; and promote agricultural and 
livestock production and organize food supply.' In common with most 
concurrent list of competencies, an override rule is provided; local by-laws 
cannot be passed that do not comply with federal and state legislation. 14 
'Participatory' common competencies 
A variation of the first type is the so-called participatory competencies -local 
government is expected to work alongside and assist the other levels of 
government in a particular functional area. The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 
offers a good example of this. After listing local government's 'exclusive' 
powers, the Constitution provides that the functions oflocal authorities 'shall 
include participation' in state functions such as the provision of education, 
agriculture, and health services. 15 
Even where the allocation of competencies is distinct, judicial interpretation 
can impose participatory duties. In South Africa, the Constitutional Court,I6 
in giving effect to the socio-economic right to adequate housing,I7 held that 
the duty on the government to provide shelter as a minimum requirement, fell 
on all three spheres of government - national, provincial and local. This 
despite the fact that 'housing', as a competency, does not fall within local 
government's list of competencies, but forms part of the national and 
provincial governments' list of concurrent competencies. '8 The court 
reasoned that in view of the principle of cooperative government, policies and 
actions of all three spheres must cohere and be coordinated to give effect to 
the socio-economic right to housing. While the national government would 
ultimately be responSible for the provision of finances, and the provincial 
government for the implementation of a housing programme, municipalities 
would play a supportive role in the provision of water, sanitation and 
electricity - all matters that fall squarely within their functional areas. 19 
National legislation can also confer participatory functions. In Spain 
13Section 44(1) and Schedule 4. See Steytler 'Concurrency and co-operative 
government: the law and practice in South Africa' (2001) 16/2 SA Public Law 241. 
14Soures 'Intergovernmental relations in Brazil' in Intergovernmental relations: an 
international comparative study (1998) (Bellville: School of Government, University 
of the Western Cape) 62. 
IsAnicle 7(2) Nigerian Constitution 1999. 
16Government of RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 883 (CC). 
17Section 26 constitution. 
18Schedule 4A constitution. 
19See De Visser, Mettler & Cottle 'RealiSing the right to water: pipe dream or 
watershed?' (2003) 7/1 Law, Democracy & Development 27. 
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municipalities are authorised to provide 'complementary services' to those of 
the other levels of government in the areas of education, culture, housing, 
health and environmental protection. This results in shared competencies with 
national and regional governments. 20 
Supervisory overlap 
In practice common competencies arise where local government's powers are 
exercised within regulatory frameworks set by federal or state governments. 
With regard to the same functional area, both levels of government have 
authOrity, albeit it that the state government's powers should be only 
regulatory. 
In South Africa the Constitution provides that national and provincial 
government may regulate the exercise by municipalities of their powers in the 
listed functional areas. 21 Both the national and the provincial governments 
have legislative authority to see to the effective performance by municipalities 
of their functions by regulating their executive authority.22 However, such 
regulation is subject to an elusive override test: the national and provincial 
government may not 'compromise or impede a municipality's ability to 
govern'.23 
Framework legislation is also often used in countries where local government 
enjoys no constitutional protection. For example, in the Canadian province of 
Newfoundland, having granted the cities in that prOvince plenary powers, 
provincial legislation may set standards for municipal services in the fields of 
the environment, safety, and the protection of people and property.24 
Framework legislation, of course, begs the question of where regulation stops 
and undue control and intervention begin. Moreover, framework legislation, 
as the experience in Germany shows,25 can be very extensive and in the end 
governs the entire functional area. 
Open-ended or vaguely defined competencies 
Even where competencies are exclusively allocated to local government, vague 
and open-ended definitions of such powers result in practice in overlapping 
competencies. As indicated above, in the Constitutions of Germany, Brazil and 
Spain the right of local government to manage its 'own affairs' or 'local 
interests' is guaranteed, but the exact ambit of the 'own affairs' or 'local 
interests' is not spelled out. The scope of 'local interest' is, of course, not self-
defining. 
A similar definitional problem is encountered in a number of constitutions 
20Canei 'Local government in the Spanish autonomic state' (1994) 20/1 Local 
Government Studies 44 at 50. 
210e Visser 'Powers of local government' (2002) 17 SA Public Law 223. 
22Section 155(7) constitution. 
2JSections 156(3) & 151(4) constitution. 
24Newfoundland Cities Act of 2000. 
2!lBertelsmann Commission Disentanglement 2005: ten reform proposals for better 
governance in tbe German federal system (2000) at 11ff. 
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where a given functional area is divided between two levels of government on 
the criterion which is no more precise than the terms 'local' or 'state'. A state 
will be allocated 'state health services' while a municipality is responsible for 
'local health services'. This again begs the question of where 'local health 
services' end and 'state health services' commence? Definitions of this kind 
appear in the Constitutions of Brazil,26 South Africa, and India. In South 
Africa, for example, functional areas overlap between provincial and local 
government in the areas of health, tourism, transport, trade, sport, roads, 
recreation and even abattoirs. There is no a priori answer to the question of 
where local government ends and state or provincial government begins. 
When does a health service stop being a municipal concern and become a 
provincial health service? Without a clear answer there is an inevitable overlap 
in competency with regard to the administration of health services. 
Nature of functional area 
In many areas the neat division of competencies is not a feasible option and 
overlaps must inevitably occur because life can simply not be poured into 
watertight compartments. By according to one level of government the 
responsibility of, say, the environment, overlaps will inevitably emerge with a 
host of competencies of the other levels of government. In South Africa, for 
example, the environment is a common competency of the national and 
provincial governments, yet a number of local government competencies 
impact on the environment, such as beaches, waste disposal, air pollution, 
sanitation, and tourism. This illustrates the fact that the interconnectedness 
of social life makes neat allocation of competencies virtually impossible. 
Plenary powers 
The granting of plenary powers to local authorities may also have the effect of 
creating fields of common competencies. In federations where local 
government is not constitutionally protected, the allocation of powers has 
changed from precise descriptions which were restrictively interpreted, to 
broader plenary powers which should be generously interpreted. An example 
is the Local Government Act of 1998 in Canada's British Columbia, where 
municipalities are accorded plenary powers subject only to federal and 
provincial law. While any conflicts in legislation are resolved in favour of the 
senior levels of government, the effect is that provincial and local governments 
are active in the same fields. 
PROBLEMS OF CONCURRENCY 
Common competencies create numerous problems and impact on the effective 
and efficient functioning of government. They may also impact adversely on 
the democratic foundations of government where the practice of common 
competencies may lead to the diminishing of accountability by the various 
spheres of government to the electorate. The problems caused by common 
competencies include the following: 
26Article 30.V Brazilian Constitution. 
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Duplication of services 
Where two levels of government are responsible for a functional area, both 
may provide the same service. Competition for resources and political 
advantage is an integral part of federalism, even where the notion of 
cooperative government is the prevailing norm. 27 Such competition may 
result in the duplication of services leading to a waste of scare resources, 
something developing nations can ill afford. 
Ineffective service delivery 
Where services must be rendered by more than one level of government in a 
participatory manner, confusion with regard to the respective mandates and 
responsibilities, poor coordination and ineffective communication can result 
in inefficient and slow service delivery. This is much in evidence in Nigeria. 2B 
No service delivery 
In the worst case scenario, confusion as to which level of government is 
responsible for what functions can result in the situation that not one of the 
responsible governments provides the service, to the prejudice of the citizens. 
When citizens then complain about a lack of services, governments can shirk 
their responsibility by pointing fingers at the other - a neat case of passing 
the buck. 
An example of this scenario is the outcome of the Constitutional Court case of 
Grootboom, mentioned above. The court held that all three spheres of 
government are collectively responsible for implementing the right to housing 
and that they should provide shelter, water and sanitation for the claimant, a 
mother and her children who lived in dire circumstances in a shack settlement 
which had no running water or sanitation. Two years after the court decision, 
the mother and her children were still living without shelter, water and 
sanitation. In part this sorry state of affairs can be attributed to the fact that 
not one of the three spheres of government was explicitly burdened by the 
court with the responsibility of prOviding the required services. The result 
could have been very different had the court a quo's judgment been 
upheld. 29 The trial judge ordered that the three spheres of government 
report back to court within a month, setting out clearly who would be doing 
what in giving effect to the claimant's right to a shelter. 
Local government becomes solely responsible 
A problem frequently encountered is where two levels of government are 
responsible for the same functional area, and the state government withdraws 
from the field, leaving local government as the sole provider of a service. While 
municipalities may wish to exercise their autonomy in the area, the withdrawal 
27See Kincaid 'The competitive challenge to cooperative federalism: a theory of 
federal democracy' in Kenyon & Kincaid (eds) Competition among states and local 
government: efficiency and equity in Amerlcanjederalism (1991) 87. 
28World Bank, Nigeria-Community and Local Government Development Project, 
Report PID10650 (2001) (www.worldbankorg/infoshop), 1-2. 
29Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and otbers 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 
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of the senior levels is often accompanied with the withdrawal of state funds, 
leaving local government with an unfunded mandate. The result may again be 
the failure to provide an adequate service. 
Local government dominated by overregulation 
Whereas in theory all levels participate on an equal footing in the delivery of 
a service in a common functional area, be it education or health care, in 
practice local government is often dominated by the other levels of 
government. There is no true partnership. In Brazil, where federal and state 
legislation trump local laws, in the area of common competencies, the federal 
law on common competencies enhance harmony but restricts local 
autonomy.lO The same happens even when the role of the state or federal 
government is restricted to framework legislation. The experience in Germany 
has been that such legislation overregulates to the exclusion of local 
government's own powers. 
Lack of accountability 
A common problem with common competencies is the lack of accountability 
to the electorates of the respective governments. As noted above, where no 
services have been delivered, blame can be shifted by one branch of 
government to the next. Where there has indeed been cooperation between 
the different levels of governments, and jointly they have delivered an inferior 
service, accountability can again be avoided by blaming the other levels for the 
inadequacy. 
The practice of passing the buck is facilitated by the fact that joint 
administration of common competencies often results in a lack of 
transparency. The electorate simply does not know who is to be held 
accountable for what programmes or activity. The entanglement between the 
federal government and the states has resulted in what has been described in 
Germany as, 'a system of organized irresponsibility' Y Within the web of 
entangled intergovernmental relations, no one can be held responsible by the 
public. 
MANAGING THE 'CURSE OF COMMON COMPETENCIES' 
Concurrency of competencies is part and parcel of the fabric of modern 
federations. Moreover, it is a necessary part of federalism given the complexity 
and cross-cutting nature of the social problems that the different levels of 
government face. It is Simply not viable to recapture a dual model of 
federalism where functions are neatly allocated and the levels of government 
need not interact cooperatively. Writing in the context of federal/state 
relations, Wattsl2 points out that the recognition of the inevitability of 
overlaps, has led to the extensive use of concurrent legislative jurisdiction. The 
advantage is that it provides a measure of flexibility in the distribution of 
30Soares n 14 above at 60-62. 
31Bertelsmann Commission n 25 above at 16. 
3~atts Comparing federal systems (2ed 1999) at 38. 
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power, 'enabling the federal government to postpone the exercise of potential 
authority in a particular field until it becomes a matter of federal 
importance'.33 Nation-wide standards could be legislated, givingsubnational 
units room to legislate the detail and deliver services in a manner that is 
sensitive to local circumstances. He further notes that concurrent lists 'avoid 
the necessity of enumerating complicated minute subdivisions of individual 
functions to be assigned exclusively to one area of government or the other, 
and reduce the likelihood that such minute subdivisions will over time become 
obsolete in changing circumstances'.34 
Yet the problems that concurrency create cannot be left unattended as they 
impact negatively on the very functioning of government - the provision of 
services and the promotion of social and economic development as well as the 
democratic accountability of local authorities to their constituencies. 
Countries are addressing the problems of concurrency along a range of 
options. As the issue also pervades federal/state relations, the solutions sought 
at this level can provide useful guidelines on how to structure relations with 
local government. 
The approaches to the problems of common competencies are basically 
twofold: first, seek greater division and certainty in the division of powers, and 
second, develop constructive ways of managing the tension through 
cooperation. 
Greater division of powers 
While the trend is towards greater cooperation, calls are frequently made to 
reduce the level of concurrency where that is both feasible and advisable. In 
Germany, one proposal to reduce the level of entanglement between state and 
federal governments, is to allocate powers more clearly between the two 
levels. 35 This entails a fundamental re-examination of what the appropriate 
location of functions is and will usually require constitutional amendments. 
Greater clarity on exclusive powers 
Where there is a constitutional division of powers between two levels of 
government, attempts have been made to make that division clearer. Where 
concurrency is created by ambiguous definition oflocal government exclusive 
functions, attempts have been made to get greater clarity on those functions. 
This can be done either through judicial interpretation, legislation or 
intergovernmental pacts. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court has sought to give content to the 
concept of ' the affairs of the local community' and has ruled on specific issues 
llIbid. 
34Ibid. 
lSBertelsmann Commission n 25 above at 25. 
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in favour of a municipality, such as naming itself. 36 A definitive definition of 
local self-government has, not surprisingly, eluded it. The proper domain of 
local government is a political construct that is not easily given legal clothing. 
Federal or state legislation could seek to elaborate on the powers of local 
government. While the Spanish Constitution guarantees municipalities local 
self-government for the management oftheir 'own interests', their powers are 
spelled out in detail in the Local Government Act of 1985, which lists specific 
functional areas. This method results often in a top down approach to the 
allocation of powers and functions. A more pragmatic solution is for state and 
local governments to conclude compacts or agreements on their 
understanding of the reach of their respective powers. 
After the first round of decentralisation, entrenching the creation of 
Autonomous Communities in the Spanish Constitution, the second round of 
decentralisation resulted in the Pacto Local. 37 The Pacto Local is an 
agreement between the central state and the Federation of Spanish 
Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP) for the development, clarification and 
amplification of the competencies of municipalities. The object of the 
agreement was to effect a second decentralisation of competencies and, to 
avoid confusion of roles, to clarify the distributed competencies. The process 
of negotiating and approving the Pacto Local took the best part of five years, 
commencing in 1993 when the FEMP voiced the necessity of such a Pacto 
Local. 
The agreement is important as it serves as a significant model of cooperative 
federalism. It strives to clarify the distribution of competencies in a system 
where the major part of the competencies is shared. The agreement has been 
criticised because of its democratic defiCienCies, an inevitable result of 
executive federalism. The answer to this criticism has been that the agreement 
strengthens democracy because it favours transparency. The Spanish 
Constitutional Court has recognised the importance of the agreement; 
although it is not binding, it is nevertheless important from a policy point of 
view. 
The agreement can work adequately depending on whether there is 
cooperation or conflict between the parties. The financing oflocal government 
36In the Hohenegglen case «1982) 59 BverfGE 216) the question was whether a Land 
could change the name of a municipality without the latter'S consent. The Federal 
Constitutional Court held that art 28(2) protected local self-government, 
'guaranteeing local units of government jurisdiction over virtually all matters 
concerning the local community as well as the authority to transact business 
autonomously in the area. [State legislator] may impose legal restrictions on local 
self-government if and insofar as these restrictions leave the core functions of [this 
right] intact. ' See Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (1989) at 115; Ipsen 'Relations between subnational and local 
governments, structured by subnational constitutions' in Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 
Johannesburg 'Subnational constitutional governance' (1999) Seminar Report at 60. 
37See Violeta Ruiz Almendral 'Local government powers in Spain' (unpublished paper) 
delivered at International Conference on Cities and Federalism: International 
Perspectives, 6-7 May 2002, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
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is a crucial element in making the Pacto Local effective. What is further 
needed is for each Autonomous Community to have its own pact with local 
authorities in its area. 
Effective management of concurrency 
Concurrency of powers is most often the intended result of a constitution. The 
provisions are clear - concurrency is desired - and the only way forward is 
through the effective management of concurrency of competencies in order 
to minimise the negative consequences of concurrency. A number of good 
governance principles have been used in different countries to guide inter-
governmental relations in this regard. The main thrust has been to define, 
within the areas of concurrent functions, the roles and responsibilities oflocal 
government with greater clarity and to seek greater role differentiation. 
Principle of subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity has often been applied to the exercise of common 
competencies. Subsidiarity means that a function should be performed at the 
lowest possible level where that particular function can be carried out. 38 
Where the legislative allocation of powers is fixed in the constitution, the 
principle can be applied to the administration of the legislation. In South 
Africa, for example, a municipality is entitled to the assignment of the 
administration of a function, which falls within a province's jurisdiction, if it 
can most effectively be administered locally and if the municipality has the 
capacity to do SO.39 
Subsidiarity is a notoriously vague and imprecise principle. What is best 
administered at the lowest level? In answering this question the principle of 
subsidiarity holds that if in doubt, favour the lowest level of government. 40 
Practical measures must also be devised to give concrete effect to the principle 
of subsidiarity. One method is for state governments to formulate a general law 
in the area of common competency that would apply to all municipalities until 
such time that a municipality has passed its own law. 
Sub-division of legislative competency 
Where both levels of government are responsible for the same functional area, 
a subdivision of the administration of that area can be effected by separating 
the governing principles from the operational detail. In Germany, for example, 
the federal government has been given the power to adopt framework 
legislation on a range of matters, while the Liinder may fill in the operational 
details. In practice, however, this has often resulted in overregulation with 
hardly any space left for the Liinder. To deal with this problem a new proposal 
38See Carpenter 'Cooperative government, devolution of powers and subsidiarity: the 
South African perspective' in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg 'Subnational 
Constitutional Governance' (1999) at 45. 
39Section 156(4) constitution. 
40Bertelsmann Commission n 25 above at 18. 
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is that the federal government be restricted to 'legislation of principle'.41 
Only the broad principles of a topic are to be legislated by the federation, with 
the bulk of the competency falling in the domain of the states. 
A further method of limiting state dominance over local government is to limit 
the overriding power of state legislation over local laws. In the case of 
common competencies, conflicts between state and local government 
legislation is usually resolved by state legislation automatically prevailing over 
local government law. In order to implement the principle of subsidiarity, the 
conflict resolution mechanism could be more nuanced. In South Africa, for 
example, a national or provincial law prevails over a municipal by-law only if 
it does not 'compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise 
its powers or perform its functions,.42 While the criteria are imprecise, they 
could be used to protect municipalities from unduly intrusive measures that 
overregulate local government affairs. H 
Better coordination of executive competenCies 
Where a functional area remains under the jurisdiction of two or more levels 
of government, its proper administration can be effected through constructive 
intergovernmental coordination. Again the emerging theme is that of 
establishing clarityoffunctions and responsibilities through intergovernmental 
structures. 
An interesting development in this regard is the use of non-legal protocols and 
memoranda of understanding between state and local government. In 
Australia, Tasmania has been the leading state in developing written 
agreements between the state government and organised local government, 
as well as with local authorities. In 1999 a protocol agreement was signed 
between the Premier of Tasmania and the local government association setting 
up anon-statutory local government council to develop a partnership between 
state and local government. 44 This cooperation is based, among other things, 
on a clear division of responsibilities. The state maintains responsibility for 
services requiring uniform statewide standards. Important for local 
government is the prinCiple that amendments to existing service delivery 
arrangements will be subject to contractual agreements between the parties. 
Vigorous local government 
The dominance of federal and state governments in areas of common 
competencies is often the result oflocal government failing to exert its existing 
powers. If local government leaves a legislative vacuum, it will certainly be 
filled by other levels of government. In Germany, for example, it is remarked 
that the Lander have surrendered to the federal government power in a 
number of concurrent functional areas by simply not exercising their own 
41Id at 20. 
42Section 151(4) constitution. 
43De Visser n 21 above at 234. 
""Tasmania Framework jor developing state-local government partnership agreements 
(rev December 1999). 
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powers.45 The same has occurred in South Africa. 46 
In order to counter the dominance of state governments the appropriate 
response is a vigorous local government that can occupy concurrent 
functional areas. By so doing, local government also utilises the opportunity 
to influence federal and state policy. 
It is important to note that overlapping competencies not only give rise to 
problems but also offer opportunities for local government. It has been argued 
in Brazil that the extensive ambit of common responsibilities has given the 
states and municipalities an important role in policy-making and 
implementation processes, particularly in the area of social services.47 
CONCLUSION 
Common competencies are an integral part of most federal systems. The 
question is, then, how effectively to manage the problems that flow from this 
reality. The most common approach is to seek greater role clarification within 
the context of concurrency. This is done at both legislative and executive 
levels. Effective intergovernmental relations and structures perhaps remain the 
most important way through which the effective coordination of common 
competencies can be achieved. A part of this process is the allocation of 
responsibilities in terms of the principle of subsidiarity to the appropriate level 
of government on the basis of mutual agreement. Because common 
competencies tend to obscure lines of responsibility - the public does not 
know who is responsible for what function - clarity with regard to job 
allocation and responsibility is important for the enhancement of both 
democratic accountability and, in the end, effective service delivery and 
development. 
There will inevitably be a tension between local government and the other 
levels of government with regard to competencies. This is part of a healthy 
competition that leads to experimentation and innovation, one of the 
underlying purposes of a decentralised system of government. There is a limit 
to which the overlap between competencies can be minimised. For the rest it 
must be effectively dealt with through the principles of cooperative 
government effectively to manage the 'curse of concurrent competencies'. 
4SBertelsmann Commission n 25 above at 13. 
46See Steytler n 13 above at 254. 
47Souza n 4 above at 606. 
